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Abstract In the contextual cueing paradigm, Endo and
Takeda (in Percept Psychophys 66:293–302, 2004) provided
evidence that implicit learning involves selection of the
aspect of a structure that is most useful to one’s task. The
present study attempted to replicate this Wnding in artiWcial
grammar learning to investigate whether or not implicit
learning commonly involves such a selection. Participants in
Experiment 1 were presented with an induction task that
could be facilitated by several characteristics of the exem-
plars. For some participants, those characteristics included a
perfectly predictive feature. The results suggested that the
aspect of the structure that was most useful to the induction
task was selected and learned implicitly. Experiment 2 pro-
vided evidence that, although salience aVected participants’
awareness of the perfectly predictive feature, selection for
implicit learning was mainly based on usefulness.
Introduction
Implicit learning is often deWned as a process that occurs
without the intention to learn, which results in knowledge that
is not completely accessible to consciousness (e.g., Mathews
et al., 1989; Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994). It is thought to under-
lie the acquisition of complex patterns, such as motor skills,
social rules (e.g., Seger, 1994), and the grammars of natural
languages (Reber, 1976). Originally, implicit learning was
conceptualized as an unintentional, ineluctable, and inXexible
process. Reber (1993) proposed that implicit learning auto-
matically abstracts knowledge of covariation patterns from the
environment. In addition, it would be an evolutionarily old
process; robust with respect to disorders and aging, virtually
invariant between individual humans and shared by other spe-
cies. The invariance of implicit learning was also stressed by
Hayes and Broadbent (1988), who proposed that the distin-
guishing factor between implicit and explicit learning is the
selectivity of the processes. Explicit learning would involve
active selection of a small amount of relevant information,
whereas implicit learning would unselectively store the fre-
quency of co-occurrence of all elements present.
This passive view of implicit learning was opposed by
Whittlesea et al. (Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea &
Wright,  1997; Wright & Whittlesea, 1998), who argued
that implicit learning does not unselectively capture any
structure present in the environment. They demonstrated
that the kind of knowledge acquired in implicit learning
experiments could be modiWed by the task participants per-
form on the stimuli (Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) and by
accidental characteristics of the stimuli (e.g., familiarity,
salience; Whittlesea & Wright, 1997) and the context (e.g.,
spatial organization; Wright & Whittlesea, 1998). Accord-
ing to their episodic processing account, sensitivity to a
structure (at test) is due to accidental overlap in information
processing with earlier (learning) situations. What is
learned can vary widely; structure has no special status in
the selection process. Therefore, Whittlesea et al. see no
need to invoke an implicit structure learning mechanism
(Wright & Whittlesea, 1998). In this account, the knowl-
edge acquired in any situation depends on what is attended
and attention is treated as essentially unpredictable.
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The present study will explore a middle course between
the view that implicit learning is unselective and the view
that implicit learning is unpredictable, by proposing that
people implicitly learn the aspect of a structure that is most
useful to the task they perform while they encounter the
structure. This view takes into account evidence from visual
search tasks that the relationship between attention and learn-
ing is bi-directional (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Lambert, 2003).
As proposed by Chun and Jiang (1998), people learn to focus
attention on certain aspects of a structure when it is presented
repeatedly (although this default can be overcome by factors
such as those identiWed by Whittlesea & Wright, 1997). The
deployment of attention, in turn, aVects the way the stimuli
are processed and, as pointed out by Whittlesea et al., thereby
determines the contents of people’s knowledge.
Chun and Jiang (1998) demonstrated that structure learn-
ing can guide attention by presenting participants in a con-
textual cueing experiment with search displays containing
one target and several distracters. Half of the displays had
conWgurations of targets and distracters that were repeated
during the experiment. For these conWgurations, participants
became increasingly faster at locating the targets, because
they learned where to attend. Learning was considered
implicit, because participants were not informed about the
repeated conWgurations prior to the experiment and were
unable to distinguish between old and new conWgurations on
a subsequent recognition test (Chun & Jiang, 1998).
Endo and Takeda (2004) went on to investigate which
aspect of the structure would guide attention. In their exper-
iments, the location of the target could be predicted by both
the spatial conWguration and the identity of the distracters.
When both were perfectly predictive, attention was guided
by the predictor that was easiest to associate with the target
location and only distracter conWguration was learned.
However, when each relationship predicted the target loca-
tion on half of the trials, both were learned. When distracter
identity was perfectly predictive and distracter conWgura-
tion was made uninformative, by varying it randomly or
associating it with target identity rather than location, only
the identity predictor was learned. Together these experi-
ments suggest that, by default, the aspect of a structure that
is most useful to one’s task guides attention and is implic-
itly selected for learning. This demonstration of implicit
selection of useful structure is interesting, because both the
basis of selection and its implicitness are controversial in
the light of Wndings from other implicit learning paradigms.
These Wndings will be discussed below.
Selection of useful information
On one hand, the Wnding that an aspect of a structure was
implicitly selected for learning on the basis of its usefulness
to the visual search task (Endo & Takeda, 2004) may be
expected in other tasks as well. One might argue that
knowledge of the structure is useful to the participants’ task
in most demonstrations of implicit learning. For example,
in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks (Nissen & Bullemer,
1987) participants have to react as quickly and accurately
as possible to a stimulus appearing at some location on a
computer screen by pressing the corresponding key on the
keyboard. Knowing the sequence of locations in which the
stimulus appears allows for faster responding. In the ArtiW-
cial Grammar Learning (AGL) paradigm (Reber, 1967),
participants who memorize letter strings without knowing
that they correspond to an artiWcial grammar are subse-
quently able to discriminate between new grammatical and
ungrammatical exemplars. Reber (1967) demonstrated that
participants who memorized grammatical exemplars
needed fewer learning trials to achieve accurate reproduc-
tion than participants who memorized stimuli that were ran-
domly composed of the same letters. So, memorizing the
individual exemplars is facilitated by acquiring knowledge
of the underlying structure. This suggests that implicit
learning typically occurs for structures that are useful to
one’s task.
On other hand, several SRT-experiments have demon-
strated implicit learning of the sequence of locations in the
presence of a more reliable predictor of where the next
stimulus would appear. Participants were shown to learn
the sequence when the location of the next stimulus could
be perfectly predicted from the identity of the present stim-
ulus (Jiménez & Méndez, 1999, 2001) and when the next
location was indicated by an explicit cue (Cleeremans,
1997). This suggests that selection of the aspect of a struc-
ture that is most useful to the task one performs while
encountering the structure may not be a general Wnding in
implicit learning.
The discrepancy between the results of Endo’s and Tak-
eda’s (2004) contextual cueing experiments and the Wnd-
ings in the SRT-paradigm (Cleeremans, 1997; Jiménez &
Méndez, 1999, 2001) may reXect diVerent learning mecha-
nisms. There is some evidence that diVerent neural sub-
strates underlie the formation of the spatial associations
acquired in contextual cueing experiments and the spatio-
temporal associations acquired in SRT-tasks (Howard,
Howard, Dennis, Yankovich, & Vaidya, 2004). Interest-
ingly, Dominey (2003) proposed a similar distinction
between a mechanism for spatiotemporal structure learning
and a mechanism underlying AGL. As pointed out by Seger
(1994), implicit learning of a spatiotemporal pattern in the
SRT-task involves a mechanism for the planning of
responses, whereas implicit learning of a visuospatial
pattern, as in contextual cueing and artiWcial grammar
learning, is likely to involve a diVerent mechanism for eval-
uating the Xuency with which the pattern is processed. This140 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
123
suggests that selection of the aspect of a structure that is
most useful to the task participants perform when they
encounter the structure, observed in contextual cueing
experiments (Endo & Takeda, 2004), but not in SRT-tasks
(Jiménez & Méndez, 1999,  2001), may be replicated in
AGL.
Implicitness
A second interesting point raised in the contextual cueing
paradigm is that an aspect of a structure may be selected
and learned implicitly (Chun & Jiang, 1998; Endo & Tak-
eda, 2004). This suggestion is at odds with a previous Wnd-
ing that people have conscious control over selection of
information. Haider and Frensch (1999) found that partici-
pants processed irrelevant information when they were
instructed to perform a task as accurately as possible, but
not when they were instructed to perform the task as fast as
possible. They concluded that, although participants may
implicitly assess whether or not information is relevant,
they intentionally decide whether or not to process it.
Moreover, learning without awareness itself is contro-
versial. ArtiWcial grammar learning has been shown to
result in explicit knowledge of bigrams (Dulany, Carlson,
& Dewey, 1984), which can be suYcient to achieve normal
performance on a grammaticality judgment task (Perruchet
& Pacteau, 1990). In addition, Shanks and St. John (1994)
argued that early studies demonstrating knowledge without
awareness had failed to detect explicit knowledge, because
they used insensitive measures and focused on irrelevant
information. At present, it is generally acknowledged that
implicit learning produces a certain amount of explicit
knowledge (Cleeremans, 1993; Reber, 1993).
However, there is some evidence that explicit knowl-
edge is insuYcient to explain performance (Mathews et al.,
1989) and that it may not actually be used in making gram-
maticality judgments (Meulemans & Van der Linden,
2003). In addition, it has been proposed that implicit learn-
ing produces knowledge that is diVerent from explicit
knowledge in the sense that it is not accompanied by meta-
knowledge (Dienes & Berry, 1997). In implicit learning,
people may form representations that are not labeled as
knowledge and, hence, cannot be recognized as such
(Dienes & Perner, 1999). In sum, the generality of the Wnd-
ing that an aspect of a structure can be selected and learned
implicitly (Endo & Takeda, 2004) has not yet been estab-
lished.
The present study further investigated both the possibil-
ity that selection for implicit learning is based on a struc-
ture’s usefulness to the task people perform when they
encounter it and the degree to which this selection can be
performed implicitly. To address the Wrst question, we
explored whether structural selection of the aspect most
useful to one’s task could be observed in artiWcial grammar
learning. We presented participants with exemplars that
contained several useful characteristics, one of which was
perfectly predictive. If participants would be biased to
selectively learn the aspect of the structure that is most use-
ful to their task in the induction phase, they would learn the
perfectly predictive feature rather than the other character-
istics. To address the second question of this study, we
investigated the degree to which learning was implicit by
estimating performance on a classiWcation test in the
absence of explicit knowledge.
Experiment 1
Endo and Takeda (2004) showed that implicit learning in
the contextual cueing paradigm was limited to the aspect of
a structure that was most useful to the search task partici-
pants performed when they encountered the structure. To
explore whether or not such selectivity could be demon-
strated in another implicit learning paradigm, we presented
each participant with exemplars from two artiWcial gram-
mars (see Fig. 1). The grammars consist of diVerent rules
governing the order of the letters in their exemplars, result-
ing in the occurrence of distinctive groups of two and three
letters (bigrams and trigrams). Similarly, they specify
diVerent probabilities of occurrence for the letters overall,
and at each position in an exemplar. Each of these charac-
teristics could potentially facilitate the participants’ task in
the induction phase, which was to memorize the exemplars
and the side of the screen where they appeared. A charac-
teristic’s actual usefulness, however, would depend on the
proportion of exemplars it applies to, henceforth its predic-
tive value (the number of induction phase exemplars from
one grammar in which the characteristic occurs minus the
number of induction phase exemplars from the other gram-
mar in which the characteristic occurs, divided by the total
number of induction phase exemplars from a grammar, 32
here).
In the experiments of Endo and Takeda (2004), selective
learning of the most useful aspect of the structure was
observed for perfect predictors of the target location. In our
attempt to replicate their Wnding, we therefore included a
perfectly predictive feature in one of the stimulus sets. Our
main question was whether or not people are biased to
selectively learn this feature at the expense of less predic-
tive characteristics. Therefore, participants were presented
with two kinds of stimuli at test. One half of these could be
classiWed on the basis of both the feature and the less pre-
dictive characteristics, while the other half could only be
classiWed on the basis of the less predictive characteristics.
A baseline level of learning for the other characteristics wasPsychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 141
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obtained with the stimulus set without a feature. The char-
acteristics with the highest predictive values for each stimu-
lus set are shown in Table 1.
Method
Participants
A total of 56 undergraduate students of Leiden University
(17 males, 39 females, 17–29 years of age; M =2 0 . 3 7 ,
SD = 2.86) participated in this experiment. They signed up
for either a 30-min session or a 15-min session. Students
who signed up for a 30-min session were randomly
assigned to two experimental groups and students who
signed up for a 15-min session were randomly assigned to
two control groups, so that each group contained 14 partici-
pants. The students received either course credits or money
for their participation; experimental participants were paid
D 4.50 and control participants were paid D 3.
Design
Three independent variables were manipulated in the
experiment. Firstly, the participants were divided into two
experimental groups and two control groups. The experi-
mental groups were presented with an induction phase, in
which they had to memorize exemplars from two artiWcial
Fig. 1 ArtiWcial grammars used 
in this study. Grammars A1 and 
B1 generated Stimulus Set 1, 
with a perfectly predictive fea-
ture. Grammars A2 and B2 gen-
erated Stimulus Set 2, without a 
perfectly predictive feature. 
Grammars A3 and B3 generated 
Stimulus Set 3, with a non-sa-
lient feature. The grammars are 
based on those of Whittlesea and 
Dorken (1993, Experiment 1)
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Table 1 The ten most predic-
tive characteristics of the gram-
mars used in Experiment 1
Feature No feature
Predictive 
value
Characteristic Grammar Predictive 
value
Characteristic Grammar
1 Begin with M A 0.5625 Z B
0.5625 Z B 0.5625 MJ A
0.5625 MZ B 0.5625 MZ B
0.5625 SJ A 0.53125 QJ A
0.53125 QJ A 0.53125 TN A
0.53125 TN A 0.46875 QZ B
0.46875 QZ B 0.46875 RN B
0.46875 RN B 0.46875 TJ B
0.46875 TJ B 0.46875 ZS B
0.46875 ZS B 0.4375 TNX A142 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
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grammars together with the side of the screen where they
appeared. In addition, they had to type in the stimuli in
order to guarantee that they would attend to the letters of all
exemplars. For the control groups there was no induction
phase.
Secondly, the stimulus set was varied between partici-
pants. Participants in one experimental group and one con-
trol group worked with materials with a perfectly predictive
feature; participants in the other experimental group and the
other control group worked with materials without a per-
fectly predictive feature. For each participant in the (exper-
imental) memorize groups, exemplars generated by one
grammar were always presented on one side of the screen
during the induction task, while exemplars generated by the
other grammar were always presented on the other side.
The order of presentation of the exemplars was random-
ized. The side of the screen (left or right) with which each
grammar was associated was balanced over all participants.
Thirdly, the type of exemplar was varied within subjects
in the test phase. All participants classiWed both complete
exemplars and fragments, presented in random order.
Knowledge of the less predictive characteristics of each
grammar would allow for accurate performance on both
complete exemplars and fragments, while knowledge of the
perfectly predictive feature would allow for accurate per-
formance on complete exemplars, but not on fragments.
The main dependent variable was the proportion of
exemplars correctly classiWed as belonging to the side of
the screen associated with their grammar. Participants in
the memorize groups knew from the induction phase which
side of the screen each grammar was associated with. Par-
ticipants in the control groups, however, did not know
which side each grammar was assigned to. If, as expected,
control participants were unable to distinguish between
exemplars from the two grammars, they would perform at
chance level irrespective of the mapping they had been ran-
domly assigned to. However, if they consistently classiWed
exemplars from one grammar to one side and exemplars
from the other grammar to the other side, their accuracy
could be either high or low, depending on the mapping they
were randomly assigned to. To check whether the accuracy
results were biased by the control group’s mapping, consis-
tency was included as a second dependent variable. Consis-
tency was deWned as the diVerence between the number of
exemplars from grammar A classiWed as belonging to one
side and the number of exemplars from grammar B also
classiWed as belonging to that side.
Materials
The stimuli were generated by the four Wnite state gram-
mars shown in Fig. 1. The grammars were implemented in
a computer program, which generated 56 diVerent exem-
plars for each grammar, consisting of either seven or ten
letters. From these exemplars two sets of stimuli were cre-
ated. Set 1 consisted of the exemplars generated by A1 and
B1; Set 2 consisted of the exemplars generated by A2 and
B2 (see Appendix A of Electronic supplementary material).
Exemplars generated by A1 always started with an M,
while exemplars generated by B1 never started with an M.
So, for participants who memorized exemplars from Set 1
and the side of the screen where they appeared, their task
could be facilitated by this perfectly predictive feature as
well as by letters occurring at other positions, bigrams, and
trigrams characteristic of each grammar. Since the feature
was invariant, while none of the other characteristics
occurred in each exemplar from a grammar, the feature has
a higher predictive value, indicating that it is more useful to
the task in the induction phase than the other characteris-
tics. In Set 2, such a feature was not available and the mem-
orize task could only be facilitated by learning the less
predictive characteristics.
Each stimulus set was divided into 64 induction stimuli
and 48 test stimuli, so that both groups consisted of an
equal number of exemplars from grammars A and B. One
half of the test stimuli, balanced for grammar and length,
were presented as “complete exemplars”. The other half
were presented as “fragments”, created by replacing the
Wrst letter of the exemplar by an underscore. The stimuli for
practice in the test phase consisted of Wve additional exem-
plars for each stimulus set: one complete exemplar and one
fragment generated by grammar A and two complete exem-
plars and one fragment generated by grammar B. The stim-
uli for practice in the induction phase consisted of numbers
and were unrelated to the grammars.
All stimuli were displayed on a computer monitor as
black text (Arial 18, bold) against a white background. Par-
ticipants were seated in front of the computer monitor at a
distance of about 50 cm. They reacted by pressing keys on
a keyboard and by writing their answer to an open question
on a sheet of paper.
Procedure
The participants were tested individually in a dimly lit test
booth. At the beginning of the experiment, the participants
in the memorize groups were told that it would consist of
two parts. They were informed that they would Wrst be pre-
sented with two groups of exemplars, a left group and a
right group, and that they would have to memorize each
exemplar together with the side of the screen where it
appeared. Subsequently, there were Wve practice trials. Par-
ticipants were notiWed when the experimental trials began.
Each trial started with a Wxation cross appearing on the left
or on the right of the screen. After 1 s the cross was
replaced by an exemplar, centered at the Wxation point.Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 143
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Participants performed the memorize instruction and typed
in the letters. When they pressed the last button, their input
was displayed on the screen underneath the original exem-
plar and a reminder of the instruction appeared. After 2 s
the screen turned blank for 1 s and then the next trial began.
Participants in the control groups only performed the
second part of the experiment, which was a classiWcation
task. At the beginning of this task, all participants were
informed that they would be presented with both complete
exemplars and fragments of exemplars. They were told that
the stimuli would appear in the middle of the screen and
that half belonged to the left and half belonged to the right
group. They were required to indicate for each exemplar to
which group it belonged by pressing either the left or the
right arrow on the keyboard. They received 5 practice trials,
followed by 48 experimental trials. Each trial began with a
Wxation cross appearing in the middle of the screen. After
1 s the cross was replaced by an exemplar centered at the
Wxation point. The exemplar remained on the screen until
the participant pressed one of the arrows. Then there was a
blank screen for 1 s before the next trial started.
After the participants had completed all trials, they were
asked to write down whether they had noticed any diVer-
ences between the left group and the right group and, if
they had, what these diVerences were. Finally, the partici-
pants were thanked for their participation. The experiment
took about 25 min for the memorize groups and 15 min for
the control groups.
Analyses for type of knowledge
The question of whether or not selective learning could
occur without leading to awareness was addressed by esti-
mating performance on the classiWcation test in the absence
of explicit knowledge. Shanks and St. John (1994) have
pointed out that deducting explicit knowledge from a com-
bined measure of implicit and explicit knowledge only
results in a valid estimate of implicit knowledge when the
test of explicit knowledge taps the information that partici-
pants actually use and is sensitive to all relevant knowl-
edge. In the present study, the measure of explicit
knowledge was based on the responses to the open ques-
tion. Verbal reports are a traditional measure of explicit
knowledge, but their sensitivity is limited. Therefore, if
participants based their judgments on knowledge of many
bigrams and trigrams, their explicit knowledge of these
characteristics may be underestimated. Knowledge of a sin-
gle perfectly predictive feature, however, would be easy to
verbalize and should be revealed by this question.
The answers to the question were scored following a
procedure developed by Dienes, Broadbent, and Berry
(1991). Firstly, the criteria provided by the participant were
applied to the test stimuli in an attempt to determine for
each exemplar whether it would be classiWed correctly or
incorrectly. Secondly, exemplars that could not be classi-
Wed, since none of the participant’s rules applied to it, were
assumed to be guessed correctly in 50% of the cases.
Therefore, the verbal report score was deWned as the num-
ber of exemplars that would be classiWed correctly plus half
the number of unclassiWable exemplars. For example, any
mention of the feature would lead to correct classiWcation
of the 24 complete exemplars and correct guesses for 12 of
the fragments, amounting to a verbal report score of 36. If
participants did not have any relevant explicit knowledge,
their verbal report score would be 24.
Subsequently, a regression analysis was performed with
verbal report score as the independent variable and propor-
tion correct on the actual classiWcation test as the dependent
variable. The resulting regression equation was used to
derive a reliable estimate of the proportion of correct classi-
Wcations associated with a verbal report score of 24 (no
explicit knowledge). If the predicted proportion of correct
classiWcations was signiWcantly above chance, this indi-
cated implicit knowledge.
Results
Induction phase performance
Memorizing each exemplar together with the side of the
screen where it appeared and typing it in took an average
7.84 s (SD = 1.31) for the participants who memorized
stimuli with a perfectly predictive feature. The mean pro-
portion of exemplars typed in correctly was 0.895
(SD = 0.064) for this group. Participants who memorized
stimuli without a perfectly predictive feature took on aver-
age 7.86 s (SD = 2.89) per exemplar. The mean proportion
of exemplars they typed in correctly was 0.913
(SD = 0.066). There were no signiWcant diVerences in
exposure time (t(26) < 1, 95% CI = ¡1.77 to 1.72) or accu-
racy (t(26) < 1, 95% CI = ¡0.068 to 0.033) for the two
stimulus sets.
Test phase performance
The mean proportions of correct classiWcations for each
group, stimulus set, and type of exemplar are shown in
Table 2. The main analysis was a 2-between, 1-within
mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the propor-
tion of correct classiWcations; with group (memorize, con-
trol) and stimulus set (with feature, without feature) as
between-subjects variables and type of exemplar (complete
exemplar, fragment) as within-subjects variable. The
ANOVA showed signiWcant main eVects of group
(F(1,52) = 40.217, MSE = 0.025, P < 0.001) and type of144 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
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exemplar (F(1,52) = 24.916, MSE = 0.010, P <0 . 0 0 1 ) ,  s i g -
niWcant two-way interactions of group and type of exem-
plar (F(1,52) = 21,921, MSE = 0.010, P < 0.001) and of
stimulus set and type of exemplar (F(1,52) = 30.049,
MSE = 0.010, P < 0.001) and a signiWcant three-way inter-
action of group, stimulus set and type of exemplar
(F(1,52) = 23.395, MSE = 0.010, P < 0.001). Because main
eVects and two-way interactions are qualiWed by this three-
way interaction, they will not be interpreted.
The contribution of stimulus set to the three-way interac-
tion is examined Wrst, because participants were expected
to learn diVerent characteristics of the two sets of stimuli.
For the stimulus set with a feature, there was a signiWcant
interaction between group and type of exemplar (F(1,26) =
33.905, MSE = 0.013, P < 0.001). Independent samples t tests
showed that more complete exemplars were classiWed cor-
rectly by the memorize group than by the control group
(t(26) = 6.139, P < 0.001). For fragments, however, there
was no signiWcant diVerence (t(26) < 1, 95% CI = ¡0.055
to 0.102). For the stimulus set without a feature, only the
main eVect of group was signiWcant (F(1,26) = 17.137,
MSE = 0.026, P < 0.001). The proportion of correct classi-
Wcations was higher for the memorize group (M =0 . 6 7 6 ,
SD = 0.143) than for the control group (M = 0.497,
SD = 0.075).
The ANOVA on the consistency scores showed the same
pattern of results (see Table 3), indicating that the accuracy
data were not biased by the way the grammars were
assigned to the sides of the screen for the control group. In
addition, this analysis indicated that participants who mem-
orized exemplars containing a perfectly predictive feature
did not learn any other characteristics of the grammars. If
they had learned other characteristics, but failed to associ-
ate those with a side of the screen, they would have been
more consistent than control participants in grouping frag-
ments from the same grammar together. In summary, the
results indicate that participants who memorized exemplars
with a perfectly predictive feature were biased to learn only
this characteristic, whereas participants who memorized
exemplars without such a feature learned the less predictive
characteristics of each grammar.
Type of knowledge
Participants who memorized exemplars from the stimulus
set with a perfectly predictive feature reported 16 character-
istic letters, 27 letters at speciWc positions, 3 bigrams and 6
global characteristics (see Table 1 in Appendix B of Elec-
tronic supplementary material). Their verbal report scores
over all exemplars ranged from 23.5 to 39.5 out of 48
(M = 32.9, SD = 5.5). Because the performance analysis
indicated that these participants had knowledge relevant to
complete exemplars, but not to fragments, the present anal-
ysis was restricted to verbal report scores over complete
exemplars. Those scores ranged from 11.5 to 24 out of 24
(M = 20.4, SD = 5.2). Nine participants had complete
Table 2 Mean proportions of correct classiWcations and standard deviations for each type of exemplar by stimulus set and group for Experiment
1 and Experiment 2
Standard deviations are in parentheses
Group Feature No feature
Complete Fragment Complete Fragment
Experiment 1
Memorize 0.896 (0.148) 0.527 (0.126) 0.670 (0.157) 0.682 (0.149)
Control 0.521 (0.174) 0.503 (0.068) 0.494 (0.107) 0.500 (0.080)
Experiment 2
Memorize 0.772 (0.178) 0.621 (0.169)
Control 0.506 (0.081) 0.503 (0.040)
Table 3 Consistency analyses
* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01, *** P <0 . 0 0 1
EVect Experiment
12
Stimulus set £ Group £ 
Type of exemplar
F(1,52) = 19.496***
Without feature
Group F(1,26) = 12.519**
With feature
Group £ Type 
of exemplar
F(1,26) = 19.866*** F(1,26) = 4.417*
Complete exemplars
Group t(26) = 5.315*** t(16.0) = 5.063***
Fragments
Group t(26) = 1.604 t(14.6) = 3.287**Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 145
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explicit knowledge of the feature. The regression analysis
showed that the verbal report score was a signiWcant
predictor of the proportion of complete exemplars classiWed
correctly (F(1,12) = 18.025, P = 0.001). The predicted pro-
portion of correct classiWcations for a verbal report score of
12, corresponding to no explicit knowledge, was 0.708,
which is signiWcantly above chance (95% CI = 0.597–
0.820).
Participants who memorized exemplars from the stimulus
set without a feature reported 15 letters, 17 bigrams, 16 tri-
grams, one group of 4 letters and 3 global characteristics
(see Table 1 in Appendix B of Electronic supplementary
material). Their verbal report scores over all exemplars
ranged from 22 to 41.5 out of 48 (M = 30.6, SD = 7.3). The
regression analysis showed that the verbal report score was a
signiWcant predictor of the proportion of correct classiWca-
tions (F(1,12) = 72.163, P < 0.001). The predicted propor-
tion of correct classiWcations for a verbal report score of 24,
corresponding to no explicit knowledge, was 0.555, which is
signiWcantly above chance (95% CI = 0.510–0.600).
Discussion
We investigated the hypothesis that people are biased to
selectively learn only the aspect of a structure that is most
useful to the task they perform when they encounter the
structure. The results of Experiment 1 showed that, after
memorizing exemplars from two artiWcial grammars that
could be distinguished on the basis of several characteris-
tics, including one perfectly predictive feature, participants
were able to classify complete exemplars, while they were
unable to classify exemplars from which the feature had
been removed. This indicates that they had learned the per-
fectly predictive feature, but not the other characteristics of
each grammar. In contrast, participants who could only use
the less predictive characteristics to facilitate their task
were signiWcantly better than the control group for both
types of exemplars. Their overall performance of 67% cor-
rect was similar to the 66% correct found by Whittlesea and
Dorken (1993, Experiment 1: unambiguous items), who
also asked participants to classify exemplars to one of two
grammars. In short, the results were in accordance with the
hypothesis. When several aspects of the structure were use-
ful to the induction task, only the most useful aspect was
learned. However, the other aspects could be learned if
there was no more useful alternative.
In addition, the aspect most useful to the task in the
induction phase seemed to be selected and learned implic-
itly. For participants who memorized exemplars from the
stimulus set without a feature and the side of the screen
where they appeared, the regression analysis indicated a
small, but signiWcant, ability to classify new exemplars in
the absence of explicit knowledge. Although this Wnding
should be interpreted cautiously, because the verbal reports
may have been insuYciently sensitive, it suggests that par-
ticipants had explicit knowledge related to some letters at
certain positions, bigrams or trigrams and implicit knowl-
edge related to others. Of the participants who memorized
exemplars containing a perfectly predictive feature together
with the side of the screen where they appeared, some
explicitly reported the feature. Nevertheless, the regression
analysis showed above chance performance on complete
exemplars in the absence of explicit knowledge, probably
indicating that the remaining participants had learned it
implicitly. As it seems unlikely that participants who based
their classiWcations on a single feature would fail to report
it on the questionnaire, this suggests that very simple infor-
mation that is useful to one’s task can be learned selectively
without reaching awareness.
The results of the present experiment could be taken as
evidence that the Wnding of implicit selection and learning
of useful information (Endo & Takeda, 2004) generalizes
from the contextual cueing paradigm to artiWcial grammar
learning. However, it could be argued that the feature was
not only the most useful aspect of the structure in the pres-
ent experiment, but also the most salient. Whittlesea and
Wright (1997) have shown that people may fail to learn
aspects of a structure when their attention is captured by a
salient feature. The Wndings of Endo and Takeda (2004)
suggest that usefulness to one’s current task may indepen-
dently draw attention to an aspect of a structure. We tenta-
tively suggest that using any aspect of a structure to
perform a task provides suYcient attention to the aspect to
be learned implicitly. When an aspect of the structure is
salient, however, it is likely to capture attention more fully
and to be learned explicitly (Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Can-
tor, 1980; though see Turner & Fischler, 1993). If the most
useful aspect of the structure in Experiment 1 was also
salient, the relative contributions of the two factors remain
unclear. Learning may even have been restricted to the fea-
ture, because attention was fully captured by its salience,
leaving the rest of the exemplar unattended.
Several aspects of the data from the present experiment
make this extreme interpretation unlikely. Firstly, partici-
pants typed in 90% of the exemplars faultlessly in the
induction phase, which requires at least some attention to
the subsequent letters in the string. Secondly, if the salient
feature were the only aspect of the structure that was
attended during the induction phase, one might expect par-
ticipants exposed to the feature to spend less time looking
at the exemplars than participants memorizing exemplars
without a salient feature. In addition, one would expect all
learning of the feature to be explicit. These expectations
were not supported by the data. Nevertheless, we conducted
a second experiment to investigate whether selective146 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
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implicit learning of a perfectly predictive feature can occur
when its salience is reduced.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, two grammars were used that contained
invariant second letters instead of an invariant Wrst letter.
Frick and Lee (1995) found that 79% of participants noticed
an invariant Wrst letter in otherwise random letter sequences,
whereas only 24% noticed an invariant second letter. There-
fore, removing the invariant letter from the Wrst position was
expected to reduce the feature’s salience, without aVecting
its usefulness to the task of memorizing each exemplar and
the side of the screen where it appeared. The results of Endo
and Takeda (2004) suggest that the feature will be implicitly
selected for learning as long as it is the most useful aspect of
the structure with respect to the induction task. This leads to
the prediction that, as in Experiment 1, participants in
Experiment 2 will be biased to learn the perfectly predictive
feature rather than the other characteristics of the grammars.
Alternatively, if selection of the feature was based on its
salience in Experiment 1, learning of the feature would be
diminished by a reduction in salience. In that case, no diVer-
ence between complete exemplars and fragments would be
expected in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
There were 28 participants in this experiment (9 males, 19
females; 19–34 years, M = 23.21, SD = 3.35). All partici-
pants were students of Leiden University and none of them
had participated in Experiment 1. The students could sign
up for either a 30-min session or a 15-min session. The 14
students who signed up for a 30-min session were assigned
to the experimental group; 14 students who signed up for a
15-min session were assigned to the control group. They
received either course credits or money for their participa-
tion; experimental participants were paid D 4.50 and con-
trol participants were paid D 2.
Materials
In Experiment 2, only a stimulus set with a perfectly pre-
dictive feature was used (see Appendix A of Electronic
supplementary material). The feature occurred in the sec-
ond position rather than in the Wrst. This shift in position
was assumed to make the feature less salient without dimin-
ishing its predictive value in memorizing the exemplars and
the side of the screen where they appeared. (See Table 4 for
the characteristics with the highest predictive values in this
stimulus set). To keep the length of the exemplars from the
two grammars equal and to keep the grammars as similar as
possible to those used in Experiment 1, both Grammar A3
and Grammar B3 contained an invariant second letter (see
Fig. 1). The exemplars varied in length from 8 to 11 rather
than from 7 to 10 letters and the fragments for the test phase
were created by removing the second letter instead of the
Wrst. In all other respects, the stimulus sets for Experiment
2 were created in the same way as those for Experiment 1.
Procedure and analyses
The procedure and analyses were the same as in Experi-
ment 1.
Results
Induction phase performance
The mean proportion of exemplars typed in correctly by
participants in the memorize group was 0.901 (SD = 0.067,
95% CI = 0.862–0.939). Memorizing each exemplar
together with the side of the screen where it appeared and
typing it in took on average 9.08 s (SD = 3.89, 95%
CI = 6.84–11.33). Participants exposed to the stimulus set
used in Experiment 2 did not diVer in accuracy or exposure
time from participants exposed to the stimulus sets used in
Experiment 1 (F(2,39) < 1 for both measures).
Test phase performance
The mean proportions of correct classiWcations for each
type of exemplar by group are shown in Table 2. The data
Table 4 The 12 most predictive characteristics of the grammars used
in Experiment 2
Predictive value Characteristic Grammar
1 M 2nd A
1T  2 n d B
0.5 QM A
0.5 RT B
0.46875 ZS B
0.4375 TNX A
0.40625 JW A
0.40625 MZ B
0.40625 ST B
0.40625 WT A
0.40625 XM A
0.40625 Z 5th BPsychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 147
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were analyzed by a 1-between, 1-within mixed model
ANOVA on the proportion of correct classiWcations with
group (memorize, control) as between-subjects variable
and type of exemplar (complete exemplar, fragment) as
within-subjects variable. The analysis showed signiWcant
main eVects of group (F(1,26) = 21.737, MSE = 0.024,
P < 0.001) and type of exemplar (F(1,26) = 8.037,
MSE = 0.010, P = 0.009), which were qualiWed by a sig-
niWcant interaction between group and type of exemplar
(F(1,26) = 7.453, MSE = 0.010, P = 0.011). As in Experi-
ment 1, the proportion of correct classiWcations was higher
for complete exemplars than for fragments (t(13) = 3.002,
P = 0.010) in the memorize group, while there was no
diVerence (t(13) < 1, 95% CI = ¡0.041 to 0.047) between
complete exemplars and fragments in the control group.
The proportion of correct classiWcations was higher in the
memorize group than in the control group for complete
exemplars (t(18.2) = 5.103, P < 0.001) and, in contrast to
Experiment 1, also for fragments (t(14.4) = 2.541,
P =0 . 0 2 3 ) .
The consistency analyses (see Table 3) showed a pattern
of results similar to that of the accuracy analyses. Although
the control group classiWed complete exemplars more con-
sistently than fragments (t(13) = 3.079, P = 0.009), consis-
tency for either type of exemplar was lower than in the
memorize group.
Type of knowledge
Participants in the memorize group reported 9 characteristic
letters, 13 letters at speciWc positions, 14 bigrams, 26 tri-
grams, one group of 4 letters, one group of 5 letters and 2
global characteristics (see Table 2 in Appendix B of Elec-
tronic supplementary material). The verbal report scores
over all items ranged from 22.5 to 43.5 out of 48 (M =3 2 ,
SD = 6.7). The performance analysis indicated that,
although participants could classify both complete exem-
plars and fragments, they were better at classifying com-
plete exemplars. Therefore, the degree of implicit
knowledge used to classify the two types of exemplars was
estimated separately. The verbal report score for complete
exemplars ranged from 10 to 24 out of 24 (M =1 7 . 5 ,
SD = 5.1). Three participants had complete explicit knowl-
edge of the feature, which is a signiWcantly lower number
than in Experiment 1 (2(1) = 5.25,  P < 0.05), in which
nine participants had complete explicit knowledge of the
feature. The regression analysis showed that the verbal
report score was a signiWcant predictor of the proportion of
complete exemplars classiWed correctly (F(1,12) = 11.536,
P = 0.005). The predicted proportion of correct classiWca-
tions for a verbal report score of 12, corresponding to no
explicit knowledge, was 0.639, which is signiWcantly above
chance (95% CI = 0.524–0.754).
The verbal report score for fragments ranged from 12 to
22 out of 24 (M = 14.5, SD = 3.2). The regression analysis
showed that the verbal report score was a signiWcant predic-
tor of the proportion of fragments classiWed correctly
(F(1,12) = 6.251, P = 0.028). The predicted proportion of
correct classiWcations for a verbal report score of 12, corre-
sponding to no explicit knowledge, was 0.541, which is not
signiWcantly above chance (95% CI = 0.433–0.649).
Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that, by memorizing exemplars from
two artiWcial grammars that could be distinguished on the
basis of a perfectly predictive feature and several less pre-
dictive characteristics, participants implicitly learned the
feature, but not the other characteristics. Experiment 2
investigated whether selective implicit learning of the fea-
ture had been due to its salience or to its predictive value to
the task of memorizing each exemplar together with the
side of the screen where it appeared. We attempted to
reduce the salience of the perfectly predictive feature com-
pared to Experiment 1 by using invariant second letters
instead of an invariant Wrst letter. This led to a signiWcant
reduction in the number of participants who became aware
of the feature. The 21% of aware participants in Experi-
ment 2 is comparable to the 24% of participants who
noticed an invariant second letter in the study of Frick and
Lee (1995). This indicates that, although invariant second
letters occurred in both grammars in Experiment 2, our
manipulation to reduce the salience of the perfectly predic-
tive feature was successful. Thus, the salience hypothesis
predicted no diVerence between complete exemplars and
fragments. The usefulness hypothesis, in contrast, pre-
dicted that participants would be able to classify complete
exemplars, but not fragments from which the feature had
been removed.
The performance analysis showed an intermediate out-
come: although participants in the memorize group classi-
Wed more complete exemplars correctly than fragments,
they did better on the fragments than a control group. Sub-
sequent analyses suggested that participants in the memo-
rize group made use of explicit knowledge to classify the
fragments. Table B2 shows that they tended to report
groups of letters containing the feature rather than the fea-
ture itself. These groups of letters may have been acquired,
because they also had a high predictive value. It can be seen
from Table 4 that bigrams containing the feature had the
highest predictive values after the feature itself. Further
research will be needed to investigate the eVects of overlap
of useful characteristics. With regard to the present experi-
ment, the Wnding that participants learned groups of letters
containing the perfectly predictive feature explains why148 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
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they showed some ability to classify fragments as well.1
Although participants could not apply their knowledge of
initial trigrams containing the perfectly predictive feature
as straightforwardly to fragments from which the feature
had been removed as to complete exemplars, they could
still match the Wrst and third letter of the characteristic tri-
grams to the fragments.
The regression analysis indicated that participants would
be unable to classify fragments with above chance accuracy
in the absence of explicit knowledge. So, as in Experiment
1, there was no evidence of implicit learning of the less pre-
dictive characteristics of each grammar, whereas the feature
could be learned implicitly. Because the feature used in
Experiment 2 was much less salient, this Wnding suggests
that the feature received selective attention because of its
predictive value to the task of memorizing each exemplar
and the side of the screen where it appeared. In conclusion,
the Wnding from the contextual cueing paradigm that people
are biased to selectively learn the aspect of a structure that
is most useful to the task they perform when they encounter
the structure (Endo & Takeda, 2004) seems to generalize to
implicit learning of artiWcial grammars.
General discussion
Implicit learning was initially characterized as a process that
automatically and unselectively captures any regularity
present in the environment (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988;
Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1993). This view was opposed
by Whittlesea et al. (Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea
& Wright, 1997; Wright & Whittlesea, 1998), who demon-
strated that implicit learning is selective. In their episodic
processing account, what is learned is determined by what is
attended. Structure learning is therefore not guaranteed.
Recently, however, it has been argued that regularities in the
environment can guide attention and thereby aVect what is
learned (Chun & Jiang, 1998, Lambert, 2003). The present
study further investigated the proposal by Endo and Takeda
(2004) that implicit learning involves selection of the aspect
of a structure that is most useful to the task one performs
when one encounters the structure. In addition, we explored
the possibility raised by the work of Chun and Jiang (1998)
that this structural selection can be made implicitly.
Selective learning of useful characteristics
To explore whether or not selective implicit learning of the
most useful aspect of a structure can be observed outside
the contextual cueing paradigm, we tried to replicate the
Wndings of Endo and Takeda (2004) in an AGL-experi-
ment. In Experiment 1 of the present study, the task of
memorizing exemplars from two diVerent artiWcial gram-
mars together with the side of the screen where they
appeared could, for some participants, be facilitated by one
perfectly predictive feature and several less predictive char-
acteristics of each grammar. Participants presented with
these exemplars acquired knowledge of the perfectly pre-
dictive feature, but not of the other characteristics. Partici-
pants who did not have a perfectly predictive feature
available to facilitate their task, in contrast, learned the less
predictive characteristics.
These  Wndings suggested that participants implicitly
learned the aspect of the structure that was most useful to
their induction task. However, in Experiment 1, the feature
was not only useful, but also salient. Experiment 2 demon-
strated that a non-salient feature could be selected and
learned implicitly on the basis of its predictive value.
Although participants in this experiment showed some abil-
ity to classify fragments, from which the feature had been
removed, their ability was based on knowledge of letter
groups containing the non-salient feature, rather than of
characteristics unrelated to it. Moreover, this knowledge
was likely to be explicit: in the absence of explicit knowl-
edge, participants were unable to classify fragments. Only
the perfectly predictive feature was learned implicitly, even
though it was not salient.
The present results were obtained using two artiWcial
grammars and the instruction to memorize both the exem-
plars and the side of the screen where they appeared. How-
ever, the degree to which aspects of a structure are useful to
the task people perform when they encounter the structure
is also expected to inXuence learning of a single artiWcial
grammar under diVerent induction tasks. In the standard
AGL paradigm, for example, frequently occurring groups
of letters are more useful to the task of memorizing as many
exemplars from the grammar are possible than are rare
groups of letters (Poletiek & Chater, 2006). Thus, the
predictive value of letter groups may also explain which
characteristics of the grammar are learned when partici-
pants are instructed to memorize exemplars from one artiW-
cial grammar.
Contrary to the traditional views that characterize
implicit learning as unselective (Hayes & Broadbent, 1988)
and ineluctable (Reber, 1993), these results provide further
evidence that implicit learning does not inXexibly acquire
any structure that is present in the stimuli (c.f. Whittlesea &
Dorken, 1993; Whittlesea & Wright, 1997; Wright & Whit-
tlesea, 1998). They suggest at minimum that, like familiar-
ity, salience (Whittlesea & Wrigh, 1997) and spatial
organization (Wright & Whittlesea, 1998), usefulness of a
structure to one’s task may aVect what people learn.
1 Participants who did not report letter groups containing the feature
did not classify more fragments correctly than the control group
(t(7.7) = 1.536, P = 0.165, 95% CI = ¡0.040 to 0.194).Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 149
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Furthermore, Wndings from the contextual cueing paradigm
indicate that usefulness guides attention (Chun & Jiang,
1998; Endo & Takeda, 2004), suggesting that implicit
learning will reliably result in knowledge of the most useful
aspect of a structure.
Unselective learning in the SRT-task?
In contrast to the suggestion that implicit learning com-
monly involves selection of useful information, research
using the SRT-task indicated that implicit learning of the
sequence of locations was not hampered by the presence of
a perfectly predictive cue to the location of the next stimu-
lus (Cleeremans, 1997; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999, 2001).
As noted before, this discrepancy could be due to the
involvement of diVerent learning mechanisms in the acqui-
sition of visuospatial and spatiotemporal associations
(Dominey, 2003; Howard et al., 2004; Seger, 1994). How-
ever, there also seems to be a possibility that the seemingly
redundant structure was acquired in these SRT-experi-
ments, because it was, in fact, useful to the participants’
task.
In the experiment by Jiménez and Méndez (2001), for
example, participants were presented with four diVerent
stimuli occurring at four locations on the screen. Two stim-
uli were designated targets and the others distracters. In
addition to responding to the location of the stimulus, par-
ticipants had to count the number of targets they were pre-
sented with. Although the identity of the present stimulus
perfectly predicted the location of the next, participants still
learned the sequence of locations. This redundant structure
learning, however, could be the result of the task require-
ment to process the stimuli as either targets or distracters
rather than at the level of their unique identity. If the two
targets and the two distracters were not distinguished from
each other, they would only predict the next location with a
validity of 50%. The simple cue would then be less predic-
tive than the Wnite state grammar, which determined the
next location on 80% of the trials. So, this study may be
more like the contextual cueing experiment in which two
aspects of the structure predicted the target location on half
of the trials and both were acquired (Endo & Takeda,
2004). Further research will be needed to establish whether
or not selective learning of the most useful aspect of a
structure can be observed with the SRT-task.
Other questions
In addition, the scope of the eVect of usefulness on AGL
and contextual cueing will have to be investigated. A fail-
ure to learn other aspects of the structure has so far only
been observed in the presence of a 100% predictive feature.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the most useful
aspect of a structure is also learned at the expense of other
aspects when the most useful aspect is less than perfectly
predictive and when the diVerence in usefulness between
them is smaller.
Moreover, future experiments will have to clarify how
usefulness produced its eVects in the present study and in the
experiments of Endo and Takeda (2004). Like Wright and
Whittlesea (1998), we assume that an aspect has to be
attended to be learned. We propose that the perfectly predic-
tive feature drew attention in this study, because it was use-
ful to the task the participants performed when they
encountered the structure. It is less clear, however, why par-
ticipants did not learn other aspects of the structure. One
possible explanation would be that the useful feature with-
drew attention from those aspects. Alternatively, aspects of
a structure that participants do not use while performing a
task may never draw suYcient attention to be learned. In the
latter case, relatively useless aspects of a structure would not
be learned even if there were no highly useful alternative.
Ultimately, this would imply that implicit learning does not
occur if the structure is completely useless to the task the
participants perform while they are exposed to it.
In a study using a Stroop paradigm, Perlman and Tzel-
gov (2006) provided evidence against the latter possibility.
In the relevant condition of their experiments, they pre-
sented participants with color words appearing in a Wxed
sequence. The participants’ task in the induction phase was
to name the color in which the words were printed, and this
varied randomly. Although paying attention to the identity
of the words seems useless or even disruptive to this task,
these participants were better at predicting the identity of
the next word on a subsequent test than a control group.
This Wnding suggests that the possibility that the perfectly
predictive feature drew away attention from other aspects
of the structure may be a better explanation for the lack of
implicit learning of relatively useless characteristics in the
present study.
Selective learning in a broader context
Although it is not yet clear how selective learning of the
aspect that is most useful to one’s current task at the
expense of other aspects was achieved in the present study,
it should be noted that similar Wndings have emerged out-
side the typical implicit learning paradigms. For example, it
has been suggested that second language learners often fail
to acquire tense markings on the verb, because the presence
of temporal adverbs makes them redundant in understand-
ing the meaning of sentences (Ellis, 2005). Similarly,
according to a formal analysis of grammar induction, rules
are only represented when they provide the simplest possi-
ble description of the language input that has been received
(Chater & Vitányi, 2007).150 Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151
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Moreover, the failure to learn additional information in
the presence of a useful cue is a robust Wnding in classical
conditioning. When two conditioned stimuli reliably
precede an unconditioned stimulus, the stronger condi-
tioned stimulus is likely to overshadow the other (e.g.,
Mackintosh,  1971). For example, blocking experiments
have shown that no association is formed between a condi-
tioned stimulus (e.g., a light) and an unconditioned stimu-
lus (e.g., a shock) when the unconditioned stimulus has
already been associated with another conditioned stimulus
(e.g., a tone; see Rescorla & Holland, 1982, for review). An
eye-tracking study provided evidence that the blocking
eVect is due to learned attention: participants spent little
time looking at the redundant cue (Kruschke, Kappenman
& Hetrick, 2005). Similar studies in the AGL or contextual
cueing paradigms may clarify the contribution of atten-
tional processes to selective learning of the most useful
aspect of a structure in implicit learning.
Selecting and learning implicitly
A second issue investigated by the present study is whether
selective learning of the aspect of a structure that is most
useful to a person’s task can occur without awareness. In
both experiments, participants acquired implicit as well as
explicit knowledge of the diVerence between the two
groups of exemplars. The more salient the perfectly predic-
tive feature used in the experiment, the higher was the num-
ber of participants who became aware of it. Nevertheless,
participants also acquired implicit knowledge of both the
salient and the non-salient feature. This suggests that even
very simple information can be selected and learned implic-
itly.
This suggestion is in accordance with Wndings by Frick
and Lee (1995), who presented participants with pseudo-
random letter sequences containing an invariant letter at
one position. Sequences containing the invariant letter at
that position were judged to be more familiar than random
sequences of the same letters, even by participants who
remained unaware of the invariant. The authors concluded
that very simple information that would be easy to articu-
late could non-etheless be learned implicitly. The present
experiments suggest that implicit learning of a highly use-
ful aspect of a structure may even occur without leading to
awareness when it has to be selected from among other
potentially useful aspects.
In summary, the present study indicates that implicit
learning of artiWcial grammars does not occur unselec-
tively. Participants learned the aspect of a structure that was
most useful to the task they performed when they encoun-
tered the structure. This Wnding is in line with the view that
selective attention aVects the kind of knowledge acquired in
implicit learning (Whittlesea & Wright, 1997; Wright &
Whittlesea,  1998) and suggests that attention may be
guided by usefulness (c.f. Endo & Takeda, 2004). By con-
ceptually replicating the Wnding from the contextual cueing
paradigm that an aspect of a structure can be learned selec-
tively on the basis of its usefulness (Endo & Takeda, 2004),
this AGL-study provides evidence that such selection is a
common component of implicit learning. In addition, the
results suggest that the aspect of a structure that is most
useful to one’s task may be selected and learned without
reaching awareness.
Acknowledgments During part of this research Esther van den Bos
was supported by a grant from the Niels Stensen Stichting. We thank
Christianne Engelse for creating a pilot version of the experiment. In
addition, we thank several reviewers for their comments on the earlier
versions of this paper. We particularly like to thank the anonymous
reviewers who suggested the quantiWcation of usefulness, the consis-
tency analyses and the procedure to estimate implicit knowledge.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Chater, N., & Vitányi, P. (2007). ‘Ideal learning’ of natural language:
Positive results about learning from positive evidence. Journal of
Mathematical psychology, 51, 135–163.
Chun, M. M., & Jiang, Y. (1998). Contextual cueing: Implicit learning
and memory of visual context guides spatial attention. Cognitive
Psychology, 36, 28–71.
Cleeremans, A. (1993). Mechanisms of implicit learning. Connection-
ist models of sequence processing. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Cleeremans, A. (1997). Sequence learning in a dual-stimulus setting.
Psychological Research, 60, 72–86.
Dienes, Z., & Berry, D. (1997). Implicit learning: Below the subjective
threshold. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 4, 3–23.
Dienes, Z., Broadbent, D., & Berry, D. (1991). Implicit and explicit
knowledge bases in artiWcial grammar learning. Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 875–
887.
Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit
knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 735–808.
Dominey, P. F. (2003). Structure and function in sequence learning.
Evidence from experimental, neuropsychological and simulation
studies. In L. Jimenez (Ed.), Attention and Implicit learning.
Advances in Consciousness Research, 48. Amsterdam: John Ben-
jamins.
Dulany, D. E., Carlson, R. A., & Dewey, G. I. (1984). A case of syn-
tactical learning and judgment: How conscious and how abstract?
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 541–555.
Ellis, N. C. (2005). At the interface: Dynamic interactions of explicit
and implicit language knowledge. Studies in Second Language
Acquisition, 27, 305–352.
Endo, N., & Takeda, Y. (2004). Selective learning of spatial conWgu-
ration and object identity in visual search. Perception and
Psychophysics, 66, 293–302.
Frick, R. W., & Lee, Y. S. (1995). Implicit learning and concept learn-
ing. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48A,
762–782.Psychological Research (2010) 74:138–151 151
123
Haider, H., & Frensch, P. A. (1999). Information reduction during skill
acquisition: the inXuence of task instruction. Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Applied, 5, 129–151.
Hayes, N. A., & Broadbent, D. E. (1988). Two modes of learning for
interactive tasks. Cognition, 28, 249–276.
Howard, J. H., Howard, D. V., Dennis, N. A., Yankovich, H., &
Vaidya, C. J. (2004). Implicit spatial contextual learning in
healthy aging. Neuropsychology, 18, 124–134.
Jiménez, L., & Méndez, C. (1999). Which attention is needed for
implicit sequence learning? Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory and Cognition, 25, 236–259.
Jiménez, L., & Méndez, C. (2001). Implicit sequence learning with
competing explicit cues. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 54A, 345–369.
Kruschke, J. K., Kappenman, E. S., & Hetrick, W. P. (2005). Eye gaze
and individual diVerences consistent with learned attention in
associative blocking and highlighting. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 830–845.
Lambert, T. (2003). Visual orienting, learning and conscious
awareness. In L. Jimenez (Ed.), Attention and Implicit learning.
Advances in Consciousness Research, 48. Amsterdam: John Ben-
jamins.
Mackintosh, N. J. (1971). An analysis of overshadowing and blocking.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 23, 118–125.
Mathews, R. C., Buss, R. R., Stanley, W. B., Blanchard-Fields, F.,
Cho, J. R., & Druhan, B. (1989). Role of implicit and explicit pro-
cesses in learning from examples: A synergistic eVect. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15,
1083–1100.
Meulemans, T., & Van der Linden, M. (2003). Implicit learning of
complex information in amnesia. Brain and Cognition, 52, 250–
257.
Nissen, M. J., & Bullemer, P. (1987). Attentional requirements of
learning: Evidence from performance measures. Cognitive
Psychology, 19, 1–32.
Perlman, A., & Tzelgov, J. (2006). Interactions between encoding and
retrieval in the domain of sequence learning. Journal of Experi-
mental Psycholog: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32, 118–
130.
Perruchet, P., & Pacteau, C. (1990). Synthetic grammar learning:
Implicit rule abstraction or explicit fragmentary knowledge?
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119, 264–275.
Poletiek, F.H., & Chater, N. (2006). Grammar induction proWts from
representative stimulus sampling. In Proceedings of the 28th
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1968–1973.
Reber, A. S. (1967). Implicit learning of artiWcial grammars. Journal
of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 855–863.
Reber, A. S. (1976). Implicit learning of synthetic languages: The role
of instructional set. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Learning and Memory, 2, 88–94.
Reber, A. S. (1993). Implicit learning and tacit knowledge: An essay
on the cognitive unconscious. London: Oxford University Press.
Reber, A. S., Kassin, S. M., Lewis, S., & Cantor, G. (1980). On the
relationship between implicit and explicit modes in the learning
of a complex rule structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human learning and Memory, 6, 492–502.
Rescorla, R. A., & Holland, P. C. (1982). Behavioral studies of associa-
tive learning in animals. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 265–308.
Seger, C. A. (1994). Implicit learning. Psychological Bulletin, 115,
163–196.
Shanks, D. R., & St. John, M. F. (1994). Characteristics of dissociable
human learning systemts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  17,
367–447.
Turner, C. W., & Fischler, I. S. (1993). Speeded tests of implicit
knowledge.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 19, 1165–1177.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Dorken, M. D. (1993). Incidentally, things in
general are particularly determined: An episodic-processing
account of implicit learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 122, 227–248.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Wright, R. L. (1997). Implicit (and explicit)
learning: acting adaptively without knowing the consequences.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 23, 181–200.
Wright, R. L., & Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1998). Implicit learning of com-
plex structures: active adaptation and selective processing in
acquisition and application. Memory & Cognition, 26, 402–420.